There is a third way, one that would involve rethinking Israel’s policy not only toward Gaza or Hamas, but also toward East Jerusalem and the West Bank. This would aim at ultimately transforming Hamas into a political party in an independent Palestinian state, making Hamas, and other armed factions, subject to its laws on the use of force and invested in the state’s survival.Only when there is a Palestinian state will Hamas actually have to choose between accepting the legal commitments and sovereign nature of the State of Palestine and going to war not only with Israel, but with the rest of Palestine and its Middle Eastern allies as well. Specifically, if the Palestinian state would be established next to Israel based on the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, then it is likely that both Qatar and Turkey – Hamas’s main patrons, who support the initiative since its launch – will join the coalition pressuring Hamas not to abrogate the peace agreement with Israel. This virtually certainly would be the policy of most of the Arab League members, led by Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.Like it or not, the demilitarization of Hamas passes through Palestinian statehood. Not because Palestinian statehood would end all violence against Israelis, as some Palestinians would continue to challenge Israel’s very existence. But the aim should be to minimize their number; a Palestinian state could be the most effective way to do so. It would by definition seek a monopoly over the use of force, making demilitarization of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad feasible – not simply by forcible disarmament but also, no less importantly, by integrating those Hamas militants willing to abide by their state’s international commitments and obey its leadership. Palestinians in general and Hamas specifically would then face a choice between working in the interest of their state’s prosperity and continuing a military struggle against a much more powerful Israel and its Arab allies.